Active Supervision of Health Care Cooperative Ventures Seeking State Action Antitrust Immunity by Rosenstein, Joshua
COMMENTS
Active Supervision of Health Care Cooperative
Ventures Seeking State Action Antitrust Immunity
Joshua Rosenstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suffering the greatest crisis' in its history, the American health
care delivery system is awash with reform efforts. The federal
government and many states are trying to balance individuals' needs
with the demands of divergent interest groups, while at the same time
alleviating the horrific complexity of the current health system.'
* B.A. 1985, Claremont McKenna College; M.B.A. 1989, University of Washington; J.D.
1995, Seattle University School of Law. The author worked for several years in the areas of
physician-hospital integration and managed care planning.
1. For a framework describing the problems facing the United States' health delivery system,
see the N.Y. TIMES five-part series, The Price of Health (Tamar Lewin, High Medical Costs Hurt
Growing Numbers in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, at Al; Andrew Pollack, Medical
Technology 'Arms Race' Adds Billions to the Nation's Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at Al;
Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Canada, a Government System That Provides Health Care to All, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at Al; Louis Uchitelle, Insurance Linked to Jobs: System Showing Its Age,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at Al; Erik Eckholm, Rescuing Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1991, at Al). For a statistical review of the state of health care in the United States, see SYSTEM
IN CRISIS: THE CASE FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM (Robert J. Blendon & Jennifer Edwards
eds., 1991). Indicative of the crisis is the fact that at least 34 million Americans are without
health care coverage, many of whom are working. See PETER RIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADVANCE DATA No. 201, CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS
WITH AND WITHOUT HEALTH CARE COVERAGE: UNITED STATES, 1989, at 1 (June 18,
1991). Rising costs are also straining business. See Milt Freudenheim, Health Care A Growing
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at Cl (citing Foster Higgins & Co. survey's finding of a
17.1% increase in health care coverage costs to $3,217 per employee in 1990).
2. Erik Eckholm, Rescuing Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,1991, at Al. For a simple and
dear framing of the issue and alternative solutions, see Edmund Faltermayer, Let's Really Cure
the Health System, FORTUNE, Mar. 23, 1992, at 46, 50.
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Despite political setbacks at the national level,' a new model of health
delivery is likely to take shape with or without government leadership.
Preferred by President Clinton4 and some states, the "managed
competition" model' has risen to the surface as a popular alternative.
Regardless of its particular form, managed competition contemplates
large purchasing cooperatives (large businesses or consumer collectives)
and large competing provider organizations (sponsored by insurance
companies, hospitals, or doctors).6 In theory, encouraging larger
buyers and sellers with market power through a managed competition
model will compensate for competitive distortions inherent in our
current system.7 Of course, federal antitrust policy, which is designed
3. President Clinton's American Health Security Act or any major compromise version of
health care reform failed to win passage in Congress before the 103d Congress adjourned.
4. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Ses. (1993). See also Neal Baker, Health Care Reform:
Summary of the Clinton Administration's Health Reform Plan, 26 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 289
(1993).
5. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGED COMPETITION IN
HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988) [hereinafter ENTHOVEN, MANAGED COMPETITION]. See also
Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1 (1994); John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Managed Competition, 328
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209 (1993); Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24 [hereinafter Enthoven, Principles of Managed
Competition]; Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition: An Agenda for Action, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1988, at 25; Akin C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for
the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (pts.
1 & 2), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989) [hereinafter Enthoven & Kronick, Consumer-Choice,
pt. 1], 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94 (1989) [hereinafter Enthoven & Kronick, Consumer-Choice,
pt. 2]; Victor R. Fuchs, The "Competition Revolution" in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1988, at 5.
6. "[T]he concept of competition that can achieve a reasonable degree of efficiency and
equity is managed competition, in which there are intelligent active collective agents on the
demand side, which [Enthoven] call[s] sponsors, who contract with the competing health care
plans and continuously structure and adjust the market to overcome its tendencies to failure."
ENTHOVEN, MANAGED COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 82.
7. Id.
The principles of [our current noncompetitive] system and their economic consequences
are as follows: (1) Free choice of doctor by the patient, which means that the insurer
has no bargaining power with the doctor; (2) free choice of prescription by the doctor,
which prevents the insurer from applying quality assurance or review of appropriateness;
(3) direct negotiation between doctor and patient regarding fees, which excludes the
third-party payer, who would like to have information, bargaining power, and an
incentive to negotiate to hold down fees; (4) fee-for-service payment, which allows
physicians maximum control over their incomes by increasing services provided; and (5)
solo practice, because multispecialty group practice constitutes a break in the seamless
web of mutual coercion through control of referrals that the medical profession has used
to enforce the guild system.
Enthoven, Principles of Managed Competition, supra note 5, at 25.
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to encourage competition," is potentially at odds with the anticompeti-
tive effect of fewer market participants through consolidation.9 In tacit
admission of the reform model's anticompetitive effects, some reform
proposals rely on immunity from federal antitrust laws. 0 Other than
a Congressional exemption, the only immunizing theory that is feasible
is the state action doctrine."
The judicially-created state action doctrine allows immunity from
federal antitrust laws on the principle that Congress did not intend to
interfere with states' regulatory programs when it created the antitrust
laws. 2 Some states have tried explicitly to exempt their health reform
programs from federal antitrust laws, even stating in their statutes that
they intend to take advantage of state action immunity. 3 Since first
recognizing the state action doctrine fifty years ago, 4 the Supreme
Court has refined the requirements.'" Following a recent Court
decision of Ticor, states should now pay special attention to a
requirement that state-authorized anticompetitive programs be "actively
supervised."' 6 To qualify for active supervision, a state must create
and maintain a legitimate supervisory program, give its officials
sufficient authority over private actors, and participate in private
activity through ongoing, substantive review. 7
8. 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.01
(1994).
9. One commentator believes that, in general, the federal antitrust laws will not compromise
legitimate, pro-competitive cooperative ventures between doctors and hospitals. See Robert J.
Enders, Antitrust Laws: Considerations But Not Barriers to Integration, HEALTH CARE L.
NEWSL., Oct. 1993, at 20. Even so, the commentator recognizes that per se antitrust violations,
such as price negotiations and service allocations among competing providers, would require
antitrust immunity. Id. at 27.
10. Howard Feller, Healthcare Reform and Antitrust Immunities/Exceptions-Federal and
State, at 9-27 (1994) (unpublished manuscript delivered at Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n conference
"Antitrust in the Healthcare Field," on file with the Seattle University Law Review) (reviewing
state legislation in Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, which rely on antitrust immunity
in health reform).
11. For a general background of the state action doctrine, see 6 VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 8, §§ 40.01-05 (1994).
12. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-4-601 to -612 (1993) (health care cooperative ventures
obtaining certificate of public advantage shall have state action immunity); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-1923 (1994) (state legislature intends immunity from federal antitrust laws); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 43.72.300-.310 (1994) (establishing legislative intent and procedures for obtaining state
action immunity).
14. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52.
15. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94
(1988); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
16. Titor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177-80.
17. Id.
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The Washington Health Services Act of 199318 statutorily
satisfies the requirements for state action immunity, but regulations
promulgated to implement it must conform with the currently vague
judicial standards for active supervision. Because the managed
competition approach to health reform depends on antitrust immunity,
reform initiatives would stall if, as a result of uncertain effectiveness of
the state reform laws, private actors hesitate to embrace reform
opportunities out of fear of potential federal antitrust action.
Parts I and II of this Comment review the foundations of the state
action doctrine and focus on the development of statutory and
regulatory requirements of active supervision. Next, Part III discusses
the two primary components of active supervision, control and
involvement, in light of the current status of state action immunity.
Part IV then examines Washington State's managed competition-based
reform plan as an example of an attempt to secure state action
immunity for private actors. Part IV also describes the Washington
state action antitrust immunity provision in some detail. Finally, Part
V provides a case illustration for effective state action immunity,
including suggestions for attributes of active supervision necessary to
ensure immunity.
II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS
The state action doctrine was first fully developed in Parker v.
Brown,19 although several earlier cases suggested that Congress did
not intend to interfere with state regulatory programs through the
federal antitrust laws." In Parker, the Court grounded antitrust
immunity for state actors on principles of federalism.2  The Court
reasoned that under both a facial reading of the statute and the
18. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, 1993 Wash. Laws 2070. This
Comment refers to this legislation by the title suggested within the Act itself. See ch. 492, § 487,
1993 Wash. Laws 2209.
19. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved an antitrust challenge by a raisin producer and
packer against a state-sponsored raisin marketing program. Id. at 344. Raisin Proration Zone No.
I was created pursuant to a California law which was intended "to restrict competition among the
growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers," and to "prevent
economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products" in the state. Id. at 346.
20. 6 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 8, § 40.02 n.1; James F. Ponsoldt, Immunity Doctrine,
Efficiency Promotion, and the Applicability of Federal Antitrust Law to State-Approved Hospital
Acquisitions, 12 J. CORP. L. 37 (1986).
21. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly attributed
to Congress." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351; see also Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104.
[Vol. 18:329
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legislative history of the Sherman Act,22 Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to restrain state efforts to regulate trade. Thus, federal
antitrust laws were not intended by Congress to interfere with state
actions if "[t]he state itself exercises its legislative authority in making
the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application."23
Recently, the Court reinforced the principle that state actions
should be immunized from federal antitrust laws, stating that
"[i]mmunity is conferred out of respect for ongoing regulation by the
State, not out of respect for the economics of price restraint."24
However, the economic justification for the state action doctrine has
been widely debated in academic circles.25
For several decades after Parker, development of state action
immunity by the Court lapsed.26 In 1980, however, in California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,27 the Court
developed a definitive two-prong test. To qualify for immunity from
federal antitrust laws, a state must (1) articulate a clear and affirmative
policy to displace competition with regulation, and (2) provide active
supervision of immunized conduct undertaken by private actors.28
Controversy over the "clear and affirmative policy" prong of the
test has been limited, and the Court has focused on the "active
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
23. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
24. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
25. See, e.g., John S. Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitnust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1984); John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases,
61 TEX. L. REV. 481 (1982); cf. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic
Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1986) (arguing that revisionist analysis of
state action doctrine is wrong on descriptive and prescriptive levels).
26. Cine 42nd St. Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir.
1985). See also William H. Page, State Action and "Active Supervision": An Antitrust Anomaly,
35 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 748 (1990).
27. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In Midcal, California required all wine producers, wholesalers, and
rectifiers to file either a fair trade contract or a resale price schedule with the state. Id. at 99.
The pricing program standardized prices for each brand within each of three trading areas. Id.
Wine producers or wholesalers who refused to comply with the established prices could be fined,
subjected to private damages suits, or face license suspension or revocation. Id. at 100. Midcal
Aluminum, a wholesaler, was charged with selling twenty-seven cases of wine below the
established price schedule price. Id. Midcal claimed that the state's program violated the
Sherman Act, and sought an injunction against the pricing system. Id.
28. Id. at 105.
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supervision" requirement.29  Defining the "active supervision"
requirement, however, has proven to be problematic.
To fulfill the requirements of active supervision, the second prong
has been narrowly construed to ensure that actions immune from
antitrust laws are those which actually further state policies, not those
that further solely private interests.3" The active supervision prong
is intended to "determine whether the State has exercised sufficient
independent judgment and control so that the details of the [anti-
competitive activity] have been established as a product of deliberate
state intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties."
31
To satisfy the active supervision requirement, state officials must "have
and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.
32
Thus, state-sanctioned anticompetitive activities must be approved and
supervised as a quasi-official action of the state itself; simple approval
of private actions will not suffice.
One commentator believes that in the ten years following Midcal,
the Court loosened the oversight requirements and made state action
immunity easier to obtain.33 Recently, however, in FTC v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co., the Court stated that the state must play a "substantial
role in determining the specifics of the economic policy" to ensure state
action immunity.34 A state scheme that provides for the potential to
actively supervise possible anticompetitive activity is insufficient;
supervision must include actual involvement and decisions by the
29. Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 421-23 (1994). See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (stating that the Court was
satisfied with articulation of policy stating only that "[t]he legislative policy is forthrightly stated
and dear in its purpose to permit [the immunized program]."); Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100 ("In this
case, we need not consider the 'clear articulation' prong of the Midcal test, because the 'active
supervision' requirement is not satisfied."); North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville,
Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 1984). For an example of analysis under the clear articulation
prong, see Hass v. Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1457-59 (9th Cir. 1989).
30. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01.
31. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177. For a sharp criticism of the active supervision requirement,
see Page, supra note 26 (arguing active supervision is inconsistent with policies of state action
doctrine); see also William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A
Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV.
1099 (1981).
32. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
33. Richard Quaresima, State Action Doctrine: State Agencies Exempt from the Active
Supervision Prong of the Mdcal Test, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 525, 530 (1991).
34. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
[Vol. 18:329
Health Care Cooperative Ventures
state.3" Ticor arguably signals increasing scrutiny of state attempts to
shield entities from federal antitrust prohibitions.
3 6
In summary, courts require "true state regulation" as compared to
"mere state authorization" before allowing immunity from federal
antitrust laws." If the important economic and social goals of federal
antitrust laws, such as competitive markets and access to goods and
services, are to be set aside by states, then it is reasonable to require
that states be vigilant in their oversight of authorized schemes or
ventures. The two most important attributes of oversight are control
and involvement, which are discussed in Part III.
III. ACTIVE SUPERVISION REQUIREMENTS
Although there is a well-developed line of cases discussing state
action immunity questions, the Supreme Court has not expressly
adopted criteria for the second of the two Midcal requirements, active
supervision. However, two elements may increase the likelihood of a




Fundamentally, the state must exercise "ultimate control" over
authorized anticompetitive conduct.39 In Patrick v. Burget, a case in
which a peer review program was challenged as anticompetitive,
ultimate control consisted of the statutory power (1) to review decisions
made by the private entities, and (2) to overturn them if they do not
adhere to state policy."° Because the state lacked the necessary
statutory power to review private decisions and withdraw approval if
necessary, the peer review program did not satisfy the active supervi-
sion prong.4
Further, while not expressly reaching the question of what amount
of state supervision would be adequate, the Court held that the state
judiciary's availability to review decisions made by a private, state-
35. Id. at 2179.
36. Vance, supra note 29, at 417.
37. Garland, supra note 25, at 501.
38. Theodore N. McDowell & J. Marbury Rainer, The State Action Doctrine and the Local
Government Antitrust Act: The Restructured Public Hospital Model, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 202
(1988).
39. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101; see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48, 51 (1985).
40. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102.
41. Id. at 102-03.
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authorized board was insufficient supervision to satisfy the state action
doctrine.42 Although stopping short of holding that judicial review
could never satisfy active supervision requirements, the Court stated
that the haziness of Oregon law providing for judicial review of peer
review decisions43 and the limited nature of judicial review in Ore-
gon44 indicated that judicial review did not satisfy active supervision
in this case.
Thus, by implication the control requirement for active supervi-
sion contemplates a state program which has continuing, tangible state
participation in the activities of private actors. Neither potential state
involvement nor the substitution of the judiciary for regulatory
involvement is enough. To ensure immunity, state regulators
necessarily must have, and must exercise, the authority to control
private activity.
B. Involvement
The other component of active supervision is state involvement in
private activities. When formulating the Midcal test, the Court's
primary consideration was "whether the State's involvement... [was]
sufficient to establish anti-trust immunity under Parker v. Brown."4
Thus, without involvement by state regulators, the active supervision
element cannot be met.
For example, in Ticor, a "negative-option" scheme4 6 for approval
of private rate setting was held to be insufficient for active supervi-
sion.47 Holding that a five-part test applied by the First" and
Third49 Circuit Courts was inadequate, the Supreme Court required
42. Id. at 103-05. For a discussion of judicial review as an element of active supervision,
see Note, Judicial Review as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private Parties from Antitrust
Liability, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (1988).
43. "[W]e are aware of no case in which an Oregon court has held that judicial review of
peer-review decisions is available." Patrick, 486 U.S. at 104.
44. E.g., "lilt would be unwise for a court to do more than to make sure that some sort of
reasonable procedure was afforded . I..." Id. at 104-05 (quoting Straube v. Emanuel Lutheran
Charity Bd., 287 Or. 375, 384, 600 P.2d 381, 386 (1979)).
45. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103.
46. In a negative-option scheme, jointly established rates or other suspect actions are
submitted to a state regulatory body; the regulatory body then has a defined length of time in
which to respond to the proposal. If the body does not respond within the prescribed response
period, then the proposal automatically goes into effect. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2174.
47. Id. at 2179-80.
48. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1136 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2169
(1992).
49. New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990).
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"active supervision in fact.""0  Upon review, the Supreme Court
found the circuit courts' test to be theoretically consistent with
precedent;51 however, because mere potential state supervision could
satisfy the five-part test, the test failed to ensure that the requisite
supervision actually occurred."
Nonetheless, the test applied by the circuit courts is instructive
because it signals the elements for partial fulfillment of the active
supervision requirement.5 3 Specifically, the test would approve a
state's program if it:
[1] is in place, [2] is staffed and funded, [3] grants to the state
officials ample power and the duty to regulate pursuant to declared
standards of state policy, [4] is enforceable in the state courts, and
[5] demonstrates some basic level of activity directed towards seeing
that the private actors carry out the state's policy and not simply
[the private actor's] own policy . . ..
The Supreme Court affirmed the standard as a "beginning point," but
held that the Circuit courts' threshold for active supervision, the "basic
level of activity," was too low, and required greater state involve-
ment. 5 Thus, although insufficient in and of itself, the Circuit
court's test provides a framework under which a preliminary analysis
can be conducted.
The five-part test's deficiency could be the absence of a threshold
for intensity of a state's monitoring activity after a private program is
initially approved. For example, finding that California did not
monitor market conditions or conduct a "pointed reexamination" of the
approved program, the Court held in Midcal that the state failed to
attain the minimum involvement necessary for active supervision. 6
Similarly, in North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc.,
North Carolina authorized an acquisition of a psychiatric hospital
under a certificate of need program.57 The Fourth Circuit decided
that because the state did not monitor the conduct of the parties after
50. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2179.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. "The criteria set forth by the First Circuit may have some relevance as the beginning
point of the active supervision inquiry, but the analysis cannot end there .... The mere
potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State." Id.
54. Id. (quoting Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1136).
55. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2179.
56. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
57. 740 F.2d 274, 274 (4th Cir. 1984).
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the acquisition, there was "no active supervision at all," and therefore,
no antitrust immunity.5"
Thus, the active supervision prong's involvement criteria
contemplate affirmative approval by the state. Approving a program
that qualifies for Parker immunity must be more than a routine
process; careful and deliberate approval, coupled with adequate depth
of research, is required. Finally, continuing supervision of the
approved activity is crucial. States attempting to grant immunity to
private parties must be able to assert sufficient control over the activity
and must remain sufficiently involved with the activity following initial
approval in order to ensure that the state is an active participant.
Despite the stringent requirements for effective immunity, to encourage
health care reform many states are attempting to shield health care
providers from federal antitrust laws.
IV. CURRENT STATE ATTEMPTS TO ALLOW PRIVATE
ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITY PURSUANT TO STATE HEALTH
REFORM POLICY
Realizing that state residents are suffering from the malaise of the
health delivery system, several states5 9  are formulating reform
measures designed to increase access, contain costs, and maintain or
improve quality.60 Some of these state reform plans reflect a belief
58. Id. at 278-79.
59. While federal health reform legislation is not the focus of this Comment, many members
of Congress have recognized the tension between federal antitrust laws and health reform, and
have introduced measures to grant immunity. See American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R.
3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., and S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993): Health Care Antitrust Improvements Act of
1993, H.R. 3486, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 1658, 103d Cong., 1st Seas. (1993); Antitrust
Exemption for Medical Self-Regulatory Agencies, H.R. 47, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Hospital
Cooperative Agreement Act, H.R. 286 and S. 493, 103d Cong., 1st Seas. (1993); Hospital
Antitrust Fairness Act, H.R. 1765, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Health Care Cooperative
Antitrust Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 2640, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
60. States have taken very different approaches to health reform. For example, Oregon
extended Medicaid to cover almost all of the state's uninsured, low income residents, but it then
reduced the number of health care services for which it would pay. The Oregon system, which
has so far failed to obtain necessary waivers from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, has been labeled a "rationing" scheme. See generally Howard M.
Leichter, Rationing of Health Care: Oregon Comes Out of the Closet, in HEALTH POLICY
REFORM IN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM THE STATES (Howard M. Leichter ed., 1992).
In 1974, Hawaii mandated universal health insurance coverage. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 393-01 to 393-51 (1994). Employers must provide health insurance for all employees not
subject to a collective bargaining agreement, although employees share in the cost. More recently,
a program was created to allow Hawaiians who are not employed to enroll in a state-sponsored
health insurance plan. Premiums are subsidized by the state so that anyone below 300% of the
poverty level who does not qualify for another federal medical program can qualify. The program
[Vol. 18:329338
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that antitrust curbs on anticompetitive behavior will stall health
reform.61 Therefore, some state plans, especially those explicitly
following a managed competition model, rely on government interven-
tion in the marketplace in the form of market incentives or regula-
tions.62
A. Managed Competition
Some state plans63 and the failed Clinton national health reform
plan 6M follow the "managed competition" model.6  As a partial
remedy for misplaced economic incentives,66 managed competition
models encourage, through government regulation and example, large
groups of health care buyers and sellers.67
Managed competition attempts to bring the buyers and sellers into
closer proximity, to allow them a better opportunity to negotiate, and
therefore, to create a more competitive market.68 Primarily, this is
accomplished by implementing state-sponsored or state-encouraged
purchasing cooperatives. Members of purchasing cooperatives will be
the state (e.g., health coverage for state employees, Medicaid, Medi-
care), currently uninsured individuals not qualifying for state assis-
tance, small businesses, and midsized businesses.69 While competing
to offer the most attractive health packages to these large cooperative
buying groups, health care providers will either vertically or horizontal-
relies heavily on preventive care. See generally Deane Neubauer, Hawaii: The Health State, in
HEALTH POLICY REFORM IN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM THE STATES (Howard M.
Leichter ed., 1992).
Washington's health reform plan is probably the purest adoption of managed competition
principles. See Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 447, 1993 Wash. Laws 2070,
2181-82, (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300 (1994)).
61. See Feller, supra note 10, at 1.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(1) (1994).
64. President Clinton's proposal also is based on managed competition principals. See
Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For a concise review of President
Clinton's health reform proposal and a comparison to other proposals, see Baker, supra note 4;
see also Hilary Stout & Rick Wartzman, Clinton's Health-Care Bill is Delivered to Congress, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at A3.
65. See generally ENTHOVEN, MANAGED COMPETITION, supra note 5; Hall, supra note 5.
,66. "For the most part, there is no incentive [in the United States health care economy] to
find and use medical practices that produce the same health outcome at less cost." Enthoven &
Kronick, Consumer-Choice, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 29.
67. In Professor Enthoven's terminology, government-created "public sponsor" agencies for
the uninsured and for small businesses would perform the health care contracting activities
performed by large employers. Id. at 31.
68. Enthoven, Principles of Managed Competition, supra note S, at 29-35.
69. Enthoven & Kronick, Consumer-Choice pt. 1, supra note 5, at 31-32.
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ly integrate to form larger groups themselves.70 By directly negotiat-
ing with each other on price, quality standards, and access guarantees,
these large groups will bring competition to the health care market.71
In addition, consumers do not have the ability or the incentive72
to make the choices necessary to allow efficient operation of a
competitive free market.73 Because the party most sensitive to price
(i.e. the payer, such as the government or private insurer) is removed
from the point-of-purchase buyer (i.e., the treating physician or
patient), economic incentives are distorted.74 Physicians and patients
make "purchase" decisions knowing that someone else will pick up the
tab and, in practical terms, patients have little power to intervene
before purchase decisions are made.
This reform model raises questions about the anticompetitive
effects of both purchasing cooperatives and larger delivery networks.
Under traditional antitrust analysis, larger purchaser and provider
entities appear to be anticompetitive because they decrease the number
of competitors in the marketplace, allow competitors to share key data,
and create a monopolistic potential. Despite the apparent anticompeti-
tive effects, many states are explicitly attempting to grant immunity
from federal antitrust laws in order to accomplish their important goal
of health care cost containment. Washington State's health reform
plan incorporates many of the managed competition ideals, and
attempts to grant antitrust immunity.
B. Washington State Health Care Reform and Antitrust Immunity
The boldest attempt to incorporate state action immunity into
health reform legislation is the Washington Health Services Act of
1993. 7" The sections granting limited antitrust immunity were drafted
70. Id. at 31.
71. "There is good reason to believe that competition to serve cost-conscious purchasers
could motivate cost-reducing innovation and slow the growth of health care spending." Id.
72. "Cost consciousness" is a cornerstone of the consumer-choice health plan. Enthoven &
Kronick, Consumer-Choice pt. 1, supra note 5, at 29, 33.
73. See Fuchs, supra note 5, at 6-9; ENTHOVEN, MANAGED COMPETITION, supra note 5,
at 12 ("[The health insurance and health care] markets are not naturally competitive.")
74. "[S]ick, non-expert patients and their families are in a particularly poor position to make
wise decisions about long lists of individual services they might or might not need. They need
to rely on their doctors to advise what services are appropriate and on their health plans to get
good prices. For economical behavior to occur, doctors must be motivated to prescribe
economically." Enthoven, Principles of Managed Competition, supra note 5, at 29.
75. See Washington Health Service Act of 1993, ch. 492, §§ 447-48, 1993 Wash. Laws 2070,
2181-84 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.72.300-.310 (1994)).
340 [Vol. 18:329
1995] Health Care Cooperative Ventures
with the Midcal two-prong test 6 in mind.17
The first Midcal prong requires that the state articulate a clear and
affirmative policy to allow the anticompetitive conduct. 7' To satisfy
this requirement, the Washington Act sets out at length the policy
reasons for providing limited immunity.79 These reasons consider the
needs of patients, providers, and insurers. To ensure that the state
policy is clear, the Act also states that the legislature "intends to
exempt from state anti-trust laws, and to provide immunity from
federal anti-trust laws through the state action doctrine for activities
approved under this chapter ...."" This subsection then enumer-
ates the many reasons for the state policy, including cost containment,
universal access, and risk sharing."
The Act excludes per se violations of federal and state antitrust
laws, such as conspiracies to fix prices, allocate markets, and exclude
competitors, from authorization unless explicitly permitted by the
state. 2 This exclusion may signal the state's intention to monitor
serious anticompetitive activities more closely than less serious threats
to competition.
76. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
77. Interview with John S. Conniff, Washington State Deputy Insurance Commissioner,
Health Insurance Reform, in Tacoma, Wash. (Nov. 4, 1993). Mr. Conniff was Special Counsel
to the Health Care Committee of the Washington State House of Representatives at the time the
Act was drafted and passed.
78. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
79. [T]he legislature finds that purchasers of health care services and health care
coverage do not have adequate information upon which to base purchasing decisions;
that health care facilities and providers of health care services face legal and market
disincentives to develop economies of scale or to provide the most cost-efficient and
efficacious service; that health insurers, contractors, and health maintenance organiza-
tions face market disincentives in providing health care coverage to those Washington
residents with the most need for health care coverage; and that potential competitors in
the provision of health care coverage bear unequal burdens in entering the market for
health care coverage.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(1) (1994).
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(2) (1994).
81. The relevant language states that the exemption is provided to contain the aggregate cost
of health care services; to promote the development of comprehensive, integrated, and cost-
effective health care delivery systems through cooperative activities among health care providers
and facilities; to promote comparability of health care coverage; to improve the cost-effectiveness
in providing health care coverage; to improve the cost-effectiveness in providing health care
coverage relative to health promotion, disease prevention, and the amelioration or cure of illness;
to assure universal access to a publicly determined, uniform package of health benefits; and to
create reasonable equity in the distribution of funds, treatment, and medical risk among
purchasers of care, payers of health care services, providers of health care services, health care
facilities, and Washington residents. Id.
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(3) (1994).
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The mechanics of obtaining and maintaining immunity for
anticompetitive activities is addressed in section 448 of the Act. 3
Upon showing that an activity will fulfill the policy goals outlined in
the Act, the Health Services Commission 4 ("the Commission") may
authorize anticompetitive conduct.8" A provider or health plan may
petition the Commission directly or it may request that the Commis-
sion seek an informal opinion from the Attorney General. 6 In either
case, the Commission must consult with the Attorney General,
although it is unclear whether it is required to follow the Attorney
General's advice. 7 In making its approval decision, the Commission
must consider the benefits offered from allowing the anticompetitive
conduct to proceed. 8 The relevant potential benefits include quality
enhancement, cost efficiency improvements, service utilization
improvements, and avoidance of administrative duplication. 9
Conduct authorized by the Commission is to be deemed to be in
furtherance of public policy.9
Once the Commission has determined that authorization of an
anticompetitive activity is warranted, it must actively supervise the
activity "to determine whether such conduct or rules permitting certain
83. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 448, 1993 Wash. Laws 2070, 2183-
84 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310 (1994)).
84. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.72.020-.070 (1994). The Health Services Commission will
have broad powers to create and enforce the mandates of the Act, induding, among other
responsibilities: ensuring access to all Washington residents, designing and implementing the
Uniform Benefits Package (a prescribed list of minimum health services that insurers will be
allowed to offer to subscribers, see WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.130 (1994)), establishing a yearly
community-rated maximum premium for the Uniform Benefits Package, determining medical risk
adjustments to offset the effects of adverse selection on providers, assessing technology, certifying
health plans, and maintaining health data bases.
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310(2Xa) (1994).
86. Id. §§ 43.72.310(1), (2).
87. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310(1) (1994), an entity seeking antitrust immunity
submits a request to the Health Care Commission for an information authorization opinion from
the Attorney General. If the entity disagrees with a negative opinion from the Attorney General,
it may petition the Commission for approval directly. Id. This provision implies that the
Commission need not accept the Attorney General's recommendation. Id.; id. § 43.72.310(3).
However, in another subsection, the Commission is permitted to authorize conduct that "could
tend to lessen competition" only "[after obtaining the written opinion of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral
and consistent with such opinion .... " WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310(2) (1994). The
confusion is not helped by subsections (4) and (6), which establish factors for review of
anticompetitive conduct and mandate active supervision of authorized conduct, respectively, with
the "advice" and "assistance" of the Attorney General. Id. §§ 43.72.310(4), (6). Although the
review factors and supervision are both mandatory, the language does not suggest mandatory
compliance with the Attorney General's advice and assistance.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310(4) (1994).
89. Id. § 43.72.310(2).
90. Id. § 43.72.310(5).
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conduct should be continued and whether a more competitive
alternative is practical."' The Act mandates annual progress reports,
and requires reviews for consistency with the original petition and for
a continuing balance in favor of the advantages over the disadvantag-
es.92 If the Commission determines that any changes to the cost-
benefit analysis have occurred, then it must order a change or a halt to
the activity.
93
Although other states have also attempted to provide antitrust
immunity for health reform activities,94 the Washington legislation is
the most progressive, and other states may find that their attempts do
not grant as broad an immunity as they contemplated.93 To ensure
that intended immunity is effective, the state must actively supervise
in a manner appropriate for the authorized health care activity.
V. SUGGESTED CHARACTERISTICS OF RULES PROMULGATED TO
ENSURE "ACTIVE SUPERVISION" IN THE HEALTH REFORM
CONTEXT
As discussed above, some states or private actors may intend that
state action immunity applies to shield private actors from federal
antitrust laws. 6 However, the Supreme Court's requirements that a
clear state policy be asserted and that the state actively supervise the
activity have left some attempts to obtain state action immunity open
91. Id. § 43.72.310(6).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Feller, supra note 10; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-101 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-192.3 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300-.310 (1994).
95. Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 769 (1993); Vance, supra note 29, at 428-29.
For example, the Vermont legislature allowed the Health Care Authority to authorize health
care provider bargaining groups to negotiate on behalf of participating providers. However, there
is no articulation of the policy served by allowing collective bargaining, nor is there a provision
for oversight, state intervention, or recision of authority. The statute gives authority for rule-
making in several areas, but does not direct the Health Care Authority to actively supervise
authorized anticompetitive activities. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9409(a) (Butterworth Supp.
1994).
Under the Ohio scheme, following a request for approval of "cooperative action," there is
no requirement for active supervision. Instead, the director of health "may request written
updates," although neither the interval nor contents are specified. Also, the Attorney General is
to review any requests made to the Director of Health for antitrust concerns. If the Attorney
General does not respond within thirty days, then the request is deemed approved. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3727.21, .22 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
96. See Feller, supra note 10, at 9-27; Vance. supra note 29, at 420-30
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to successful anticompetitive challenges.97 Often, the state's policy is
sufficiently clear, and therefore the first prong of the test is met, but
the state has not done enough to demonstrate "deliberate state
intervention. '"98 Thus, it is of critical importance which supervisory
activities are "active" enough to satisfy the second Midcal prong.
A. Active Supervision and Antitrust Immunity in the Washington
Health Services Act of 1993
The State of Washington's Health Services Act unequivocally
attempts to obtain state action immunity for health care providers
operating under the authority of the Health Services Commission.99
The Washington Health Services Act proclaims that its intention is to
immunize under the state action doctrine anticompetitive activities that
meet the state's public policy objectives."
Given the relative lack of controversy over the first prong of the
Midcal test, the prong appears to be satisfied by the recitation of
Washington's policy objectives in the Act. 10' The policy goals
enumerated in the section-cost containment, universal access, and risk
sharing-are legitimate objectives given the state of health care
delivery. The clarity with which they are articulated in the statute
lends credence to the legislature's intention to base immunity on state
goals. Also, deeming any conduct authorized by the Commission as
"in furtherance of the state's public purposes"'0 2 demonstrates the
legislature's awareness and approval of Commission regulation of
anticompetitive activities. In all, the statute's clear and legitimate goals
should satisfy the first Midcal prong.
The second requirement, active supervision, is not as easy to
satisfy. Active supervision has both a statutory and a regulatory
aspect: Not only must the statute be written so it passes a prima facie
examination by the courts, but also the regulations developed by the
Health Services Commission and implemented by the Commission's
bureaucracy must also survive scrutiny.
First, the statutory provisions of the Act establish adequate
authority for state regulatory bodies to supervise private activities in
conformance with state action immunity standards as established by
97. David L. Mayer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 209 (1994).
98. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 (1992).
99. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300(2) (1994).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 43.72.310(5).
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the United States Supreme Court in Midcal, Patrick, and Ticor. For
instance, the mandatory consultation with the Attorney General,0 3
the official charged with enforcing antitrust laws, allows for an initial
second opinion on the effect the activity will have on competition.
The second opinion will lend credibility to the Commission's decision
on the importance of allowing the activity to improve health care
delivery.
The Act also outlines which factors the Commission must use in
its evaluation of private parties' applications. 4 The pre-approval
cost-benefit analysis requires that the Commission become intimately
familiar with the applying organization and its relevant market.
Without intimate knowledge of the private actors and the market,
active supervision would be nearly impossible.
The Act grants the Commission "ample power," as required in
the Circuit courts' five-part test, 10 5 to grant or withdraw authority for
immunity. Under section 448(6), the Commission must order a change
in the activity or withdraw its approval if it determines that the
anticompetitive effects of the immunity outweigh the benefits. This
statutory authority fulfills the Patrick requirement that the state
exercise ultimate control over authorized anticompetitive activity. 106
Judicial enforceability is not mentioned in the two relevant
sections of the Act. 117 Unlike the Oregon peer review program in
Patrick, the Act does not rely on judicial enforcement for supervision
of immunized private activities. Rather than relying on judicial
enforcement, the Act legislatively spells out supervision requirements.
Legislative enactment is more likely to satisfy the Court's concerns
about the availability and limited nature of review by the state's
judiciary. 08
Second, the supervisory scheme developed by the Commission
under its rulemaking and regulatory powers will be scrutinized
separately from the statutory provisions. In its regulations, the
Commission must take care to exert adequate on-going control and
involvement to ensure effective Parker immunity. The Health Services
Act has few guidelines for supervision once the activity has been
approved,"° and lack of adequate continuing supervision can be fatal
103. Id.
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
107. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.72.300-.310 (1994).
108. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 103-05 (1987).
109. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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to immunity as the defendant title companies learned from the Ticor
decision.
Because the negative-option scheme in Ticor failed to pass the
Court's scrutiny, affirmative responses to all applications seem to be
required. Unlike the Ticor scheme, the Washington law does not
incorporate any negative-option provisions. Instead, it mandates
annual progress reports and reviews for consistency. Under the Act,
if the Commission finds that the parties no longer comply, it must
revoke or modify their immunity.10
However, because the case law leaves unclear exactly what "basic
level of activity" will satisfy the second prong,"' the adequacy of the
Washington provisions will probably turn on their implementation in
regulations and their enforcement. This subject is discussed next.
B. Active Supervision Illustration-A Hospital Merger Case Study
The health care context is undoubtedly unique, and many of the
indicators of a competitive market will be unfamiliar to regulators,
enforcement bodies, and the courts. A case study illustrating active
supervision in a realistic health care setting may be helpful. The
following case, while based on an agreement of an actual hospital
merger, has not been brought before the Washington Health Services
Commission, antitrust immunity has not been granted, nor have either
of the hospitals conducted themselves in any way that would bring
their activities under scrutiny for violation of antitrust laws. The case
is used only as an illustration of the type of situation which is likely to
present itself in the future.
Therefore, imagine that the Commission has promulgated
supervision guidelines for approved anticompetitive activities that, on
their face, meet the requirements discussed above. "2  Further
imagine that the Settlement Agreement, described below, is an
ostensible Grant of Immunity issued by the Commission to Providence
Hospital and General Hospital Medical Center, both in Everett,
110. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.72.310(6) (1994).
111. Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1136; see supra note 55 and ac-companying text.
112. The Washington Health Services Act of 1993 requires that rules on antitrust immunity
be promulgated in draft form and sent to the Legislature by December 1, 1994. WASH. REV,
CODE § 43.72.030(3) (1994). The Health Services Commission took a dry run at a set of
procedural rules, Wash. St. Reg. 94-12-078 (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 245-02-
100 to -180) (proposed May 31, 1994) and substantive rules, Wash. St. Reg. 94-12-081 (to be
codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 245-02-101 to -090) (proposed May 31, 1994), but the
proposed rules were withdrawn and the hearings canceled. Wash. St. Reg. 94-17-179 (filed
August 24, 1994).
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Washington, under the authority of section 447 of the Health Services
Act. 1 3
The case" 4 used here as an illustration developed as follows: In
early 1993, Providence Hospital began merger negotiations with the
only other hospital in Everett, General Hospital Medical Center.
Everett is approximately thirty miles from Seattle, and there are several
hospitals, many offering major tertiary care"' programs, within a
forty-five minute drive of both Providence and General Hospitals.
Providence Hospital is a subsidiary of a large, vertically integrated
health care system that operates, among other things, managed care
health insurance plans. Everett General is an independent hospital
without affiliates or subsidiaries. Realizing that antitrust concerns were
likely to be expressed by either state or federal officials, the hospitals
approached the Washington Attorney General and the Department of
Justice for guidance. After lengthy negotiations, the State of Washing-
ton and the hospitals reached a Settlement Agreement.
1 6
In its relevant parts, the Settlement Agreement includes several
provisions attempting to ensure that undue market power is not
exercised by the merged Providence Hospital and General Hospital
("Providence-General Hospital")."' First, several non-discrimination
provisions prohibit the hospitals from favoring the Providence-owned
health plans, especially on price and contract terms, at the expense of
other health plans."' This is an attempt to inhibit price discrimina-
tion. Second, focusing on ease of entry and exit from the market, the
hospitals are forbidden from restricting physicians' right to provide
services at locations other than Providence-General, unless the
physician is an employee of or under contract to Providence-Gener-
al.' 9 Finally, to limit the exercise of monopoly pricing power,
113. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 447,1993 Wash. Laws 2070, 2181-
82 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.300 (1994)).
114. Interview with Duane S. Thurman, Assistant Attorney General for the State of
Washington, Antitrust Division, in Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 27, 1994) (background information on
the Settlement Agreement).
115. Tertiary care consists of the most intensive hospital services, usually requiring extensive
staffing and advanced technological capabilities. Examples are open-heart surgery and neo-natal
care. VERGIL N. SLEE & DEBORA A. SLEE, HEALTH CARE TERMS 435 (2d ed. 1991).
116. Settlement Agreement between Attorney General of the State of Washington, Sisters
of Providence in Washington, and General Hospital Medical Center (Dec. 16, 1993) (text on file
with Seattle University Law Review) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
117. Id. at 3-4, J 1.1-1.7.
118. Id. at 3-4, M 1.1-1.5.
119. Id. at 4, $ 1.6.
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Providence-General's net revenue from operations is not allowed to
increase at a rate greater than a prescribed inflation index.
120
Given the intent of the parties agreeing to the hypothetical "Grant
of Immunity," they will be interested in ensuring that the continuing
supervision conducted by the Commission and the Attorney General
is adequate to withstand antitrust challenge. The most important
feature for maintaining federal antitrust immunity is the Commission's
continued involvement in the private parties' activities. Suggestions for
Commission involvement of the three relevant provisions in the Grant
of Immunity are discussed below.
C. Periodic Review of Providence-General's "Grant of Immunity" for
Continuing Antitrust Immunity
While reviewing the adequacy of ongoing state supervision of
private actors' anticompetitive activities, courts and federal agencies
should identify the extent of control exercised by the state and the
state's involvement in approved cooperative ventures. Establishing
supervisory timetables and criteria at the time a Grant of Immunity is
given will not only demonstrate active state supervision to federal
antitrust enforcement agencies, but will enable private actors to plan
for compliance.
The Health Services Act mandates yearly progress reports from
immunized parties, but only "periodic" Commission review.1
Because health care markets are evolving rapidly, yearly Commission
reviews are appropriate as well, even though the law does not require
them. If reviews occurred less frequently, important changes in the
market could take place without state involvement, and immunity may
be jeopardized. In addition, because health care organizations are on
an annual financial cycle, the burden of producing records would be
lower if it coincided with other reporting activities.
Additionally, when the Commission first considers Providence-
General's proposal for approval, it is critical that the Commission
define the relevant market. 22 Market characterization will determine
120. Id. at 4-5, 2.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.310(6) (1994).
122. The National Association of Attorneys General Guidelines uses a customer-based
definition. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, reprinted in 64
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1,
1993, Special Supp. at S-5 (hereinafter NAAG MERGER GUIDELINES]. The market is the
geographic area in which customers purchase seventy-five percent of the product. Id. Federal
guidelines prescribe a test for the cross-elasticity of demand (the degree to which the changes in
price of one product affect changes in demand of another, related product), essentially a measure
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which market features, products, and actors are within the granted
immunity. 23 Defining the characteristics at the outset will limit the
scope of the immunity to those activities approved by the state and will
prevent resource-intensive reevaluation of irrelevant factors.
Review of immunized activities should be in three fundamental
areas. First, the Commission must ensure that no discrimination in
favor of proprietary health insurance plans occurs. Second, it is
important that physician practice decisions remain free of undue
control by the hospital. Finally, exercise of monopoly pricing power
must be monitored. Each of these areas is discussed in turn.
1. Non-Discrimination Between Contracting Health Insurance
Plans
One of the Commission's objectives is to make sure that no
"sweetheart deals" are granted to Certified Health Plans124 or other
insurers. Special attention should be paid to insurance plans owned by
the Providence-General parent organization. As the only provider of
hospital services in Everett, Providence-General could restrict market
access to only health plans with whom Providence-General has a
proprietary relationship, thereby establishing significant entry barriers
for other health plans. Appropriate subjects for supervision of the
relationship between the merged hospital and contracting health plans
include service agreements, market share, performance statistics,
"unwritten" policies, and marketing materials.
of substitution:
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in which
it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to
price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those
products in that area likely would impose at least a 'small but significant and non-
transitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held
constant.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 13 (Apr.
2, 1992) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC MERGER GUIDELINES]; see also The Structure of the Hospital
Industry in the 21st Centuty: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 279-
80 (1992) (statement of Charles James, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice).
123. Although market characterization is undoubtedly a crucial aspect of competitive
analysis, because of its inherent complexity it will not be discussed in this Comment.
124. Certified Health Plans ("CHPs") are organizations of insurers, health service providers,
health maintenance organizations, and others certified by the state Insurance Commissioner.
CHPs will offer the Uniform Benefit Package at or below the maximum premium, and will use
a managed care operational structure. No CHP enrollee may be denied health benefits because
of health status. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, §§ 427-46, 1993 Wash. Laws,
2070, 2167-81.
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Supervision should start with annual reviews of agreements
between the immunized entity and health plans, certified or otherwise.
Requiring agreements to contain identical terms would unduly restrict
Providence-General's ability to negotiate and hence compete with other
regional hospitals. Thus, the Commission should look for agreement
terms which are markedly different between provider agreements. Of
particular interest to the Commission are pricing, termination clauses,
exclusive provider relationships, depth and breadth of services, and
risk-assumption provisions in contracts between Providence-General
and health plans. Any glaring inconsistencies would suggest that a
deeper investigation is needed.
A second area to examine is market share. Stable market share
among health plans competing in the Everett market is unlikely, so the
Commission will have to determine if increases in market share
favorable to Providence-owned plans resulted from successful
competition or from advantages arising out of their kinship. Market
share changes by themselves are not conclusive of undue favoritism,
but may be indicative of anticompetitive activities beyond the scope of
the conduct authorized by the Grant of Immunity.
A third area that should be examined is the Providence health
plans' records. Access to these records will also yield relevant
information for supervision. Using data from the health plans, the
Commission should compare profit margins, administrative costs,
marketing budgets, and subscriber demographic profiles between
Providence-General and other facilities. Using these statistics, hidden
subsidies provided by the health plans to the hospital, in the form of
abnormal returns or artificially low operating costs, could be identified.
Because of the value of health plan data, the Grant of Immunity
should be conditioned on access to the records of any proprietary
health plan.
Finally, two other areas should be of interest to the Commission.
First, interviewing hospital and health plan staff, especially billing
clerks and contract negotiators, may bring offending practices, such as
internal policies favoring their proprietary health plans, to light.
Second, marketing efforts should be surveyed for favoritism towards
their health plans. For instance, special prominence in brochures and
advertisements, and promotions providing benefits only to proprietary
health plans, would be a type of entry barrier for non-proprietary
health plans.
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2. Undue Control Over Physician Practice Decisions
Because Providence-General is the only place for some physicians
to practice, the hospital could demand that physicians use its facilities
exclusively. The Commission must be sure that Providence-General
does not dominate physician practice decisions beyond the scope
contemplated by the Grant of Immunity. In addition to affecting the
hospital economically, hospital interference with physicians' decisions
may present quality concerns for patients. In most hospitals, patient
care decisions are made autonomously by physicians; however, when
a hospital is able to exert market power over physicians, the physicians'
patient care decisions may be tainted by economic influences. Thus,
the Commission must look at both objective data and subjective
indicators when supervising physician independence issues.
Economic credentialing,"2 ' the use of indicators other than
quality of care for granting hospital privileges, is a good place to start
the Commission's supervision over physician practice decisions.
Traditionally, hospitals have deferred to decisions of independent
Medical Staff Credentialing Committees on the award of staff
privileges.126  Some hospitals, though, review physicians' use of
hospital facilities for loyalty and economic efficiency.127 Only those
physicians who meet minimum cost or volume standards are granted
privileges.
Clearly, a hospital with a market to itself could set more demand-
ing economic standards for physicians. Thus, the first place the
Commission should look is at the credentialling decisions, both
granting and denying, made since the previous review. Especially
telling are decisions denying hospital privileges to physicians who had
been in good standing. Decisions that can be explained only on
125. Economic credentialing, one of the hottest topics in hospital -physician relations, has one
of two meanings. Under one definition, it refers to "a system that evaluates physicians based on
explicit costs or charge parameters, and those factors become the key elements in credentialing
decisions." John D. Blum, Economic Credentialing: A New Twist in Hospital Appraisal Processes,
12 J. LEGAL MED. 427, 428 (1991). On the other hand, it "involves an evaluation of physicians
based on individual utilization data, which serves to illustrate not only individual financial issues
in a particular physician's practice, but quality of care issues as well." Id. at 428-29. See also
Kevin E. Grady, Current Topics in Medical Staff Development and Credentialing, 26 J. HEALTH
& HOSP. L. 193, 194-95 (1993); Michael J. Baxter, Exclusive Contracting: The Original Economic
Credentialing, 26 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 97 (1993); Terese Hudson, Factoring in the Financials;
Court Gives Nod to Economic Credentialing, HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1993, at 36.
126. William S. Brewbaker III, Antitrust Conspiracy Doctrine and the Hospital Enterprise, 74
B.U. L. REv. 67, 72-73 (1994).
127. Grady, supra note 125, at 193.
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economic grounds are highly suspect, and may very well indicate an
unauthorized use of market power.
Other economic factors will also show exercise of market power.
Each physician's utilization statistics, including the number of patients
admitted, referral trends, intensity of services ordered (the type and
number of tests, procedures, and other services per patient), and length
of stay are relevant factors. These factors can help identify whether
the hospital is using its influence to pressure physicians and, thus,
capture the market.
However, these factors cannot be examined in a vacuum. The
dynamic nature of health research and technology, the unsettled reform
environment, and the broad changes in the economic structure of the
industry profoundly affect the same factors indicative of market power.
For example, advances in technology have fundamentally lowered
hospitals' average length of stay12 by allowing for fewer invasive
procedures, better home care, and more effective drug interventions.
Thus, the Commission must try to determine the relative effects of a
changing health care environment and the use of market power.
Subjective factors should also be considered by the Commission.
To complement statistical and market reviews, the Commission should
conduct interviews with physicians and hospital staff. Although
relations between physicians and hospitals have been notoriously
strained, extraordinary hospital decisions, indicating an unauthorized
use of market power, may come to light. Because physicians tend to
be assertive about issues important to them, probably only a few well-
placed interviews are needed to bring legitimate grievances to light.
In addition to identifying economic abuses, physician interviews
should be a part of the Commission's review of quality factors.
Physician control of patient care remains the standard for health care
delivery, and excessive interference from economic influences may be
a serious threat to quality. However, given burgeoning costs and the
nature of managed competition, cost control is a primary objective for
the Commission. Balancing cost and quality is undoubtedly one of the
hardest parts of the Commission's supervisory responsibilities, mostly
because the allowable trade-offs are highly subjective. Given this
subjectivity, the Commission should approach each situation on a case-
by-case basis. Because the Midcal active supervision prong only
128. See, e.g., Howard J. Anderson, Decline in Stays for Births Will Bottom Out; Hospital
Stays for Vaginal Deliveries Without Complications, HOsPiTALS, Mar. 20, 1991, at 50; Shari Roan,
Alternative Care for Mentally Ill; Health: Programs Allow Patients to Forgo Lengthy Hospital Stays
for Nights at Home and a Chance to Practice What They've Learned, L.A. TIMES, August 3, 1993,
at El.
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requires "active supervision," and not a particular result, if the
Commission vigilantly investigates undue hospital control over
physician practice decisions, it is likely to satisfy Parker immunity
requirements.
3. Exercise of Monopoly Pricing Power
The most obvious exercise of market power is price discrimina-
tion: charging higher prices because buyers have little or no alternative
in the market place.129 To prevent monopoly pricing, the Grant of
Immunity provides that Providence-General's net revenue130 will not
exceed the combined net revenue of Providence Hospital and General
Hospital for the preceding year.131  In essence, Providence-General
has submitted itself to price controls. 32  The Grant allows for
adjustments to revenue based on a national inflation factor, the
Producer Price Index for General Medical and Surgical Hospitals-
Inpatient Treatments. The effects of new services on revenue are
excluded.
33
To ensure compliance with the price controls in the Grant, the
Commission should sample a different random subset of prices at each
yearly review. Because of the enormous number of hospital services
and the complexity of hospital pricing, reviewing all prices would be
prohibitively burdensome for Providence-General. The random
subset, though, should be sure to include prices from all major service
categories, including at least per diem room and board, supplies,
129. When fully implemented, the Washington Health Services Act will establish a price cap
for the Uniform Benefits Package. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.040(6), 43.72.170(1) (1994).
The price cap will also limit the monopoly power exercised by health plans. However, in a
competitive market, prices will fall below the allowable ceiling if there is adequate competition.
If no real competition exists, prices will always be at the maximum permitted.
130. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement provides that the case mix adjusted net inpatient
revenue, excluding revenue from capitated arrangements, will not exceed the combined case mix
adjusted net inpatient revenue, excluding revenue from capitated arrangements, from prior years.
Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, at 4, 2.1. "Case mix adjusted net inpatient revenue,
excluding revenue from capitated arrangements" is a method of adjusting gross revenue for
extrinsic, uncontrollable variables.
131. Id.
132. The Settlement Agreement was negotiated prior to the implementation of the Uniform
Benefits Package, codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.130 (1994), and thus at that time was
not subject to the premium cap mandated in the Health Services Act. Once a premium cap is
established, concerns over monopoly pricing power will be less relevant because monopoly
providers will not be able to raise prices above the established ceiling. However, for the purposes
of illustrating an important aspect of active supervision, this Comment will assume that no
premium cap is in place.
133. Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, at 4-5, IN 2.2-2.3.
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operating room, emergency room, pharmaceuticals, diagnostic tests,
and skilled nursing.
Using a nationally-based inflation factor fails to reflect unique
aspects of the local health care market. Reform initiatives, varying
customary medical practices, the degree of provider integration, and the
penetration of managed care systems in the market all make a
significant difference in the cost structures of different areas. Under
the Grant of Immunity, therefore, the index can be changed to a local
index if one is developed 34 The Commission should try to find an
alternative index as soon as possible; the inapplicability of a national
index either disadvantages Providence-General because of slow growth
nationally and rapid growth in its market, or allows it a windfall if the
opposite is true.
One likely source for a substitute inflation factor is the statewide
health care data system, which the Commission is empowered to
establish, and which, at the Commission's discretion, may include
financial data.1 3' As an independent third party, the Commission
can maintain confidentiality of the data, avoiding concerns about trade
secrets and anticompetitive collusion. Over time, the data can be
assembled to establish a reliable inflation tracking indicator.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite guidelines published by regulating agencies,"6 uncer-
tainty in the application of antitrust laws is not a new phenomenon.
Uncertainty may have a dampening effect on reform as otherwise
desirable cooperative ventures fail to crystallize for fear of running
awry of the antitrust laws. The critical need for health reform
demands clarification of the application of antitrust laws in this area.
In particular, state action immunity is critical to the success of
managed competition, because once the government begins to
"manage" markets, anticompetitive outcomes are inevitable. However,
the requirements to satisfy the active supervision prong of the state
action doctrine are not clear, especially with respect to continuing
supervision requirements. Thus, the doctors, hospitals, and insurers
that will lead reform efforts must depend on an uncertain grant of
immunity before undertaking the most significant and abrupt changes
in health care delivery in years.
134. Id. at 4, T 2.2.
135. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.170.100 (1994).
136. See, e.g., NAAG Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, and DOJ/FTC Merger
Guidelines, supra note 122.
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Antitrust immunity provisions in the Washington Health Services
Act are a good beginning, but adequate regulations and follow-through
must be forthcoming to ensure their effectiveness. The quality and the
content of the review performed under the auspices of the Health
Services Commission will be determinative of the success of grants of
immunity to providers and insurers.
As demonstrated in the Providence-General Hospital "Grant of
Immunity" illustration, active supervision entails extensive and pointed
review of the Grant. The review must be tailored to the actors and
particular circumstances. In the case of a hospital merger, relevant
factors include entry barriers, influence over physician practice
decisions, and monopoly pricing. Establishing factors at the time
immunity is granted will allow the actors involved to proceed with
greater security that their grant of immunity will withstand antitrust
challenge.
